What is becoming apparent is that there are many dots that connect CF with the stakeholder-beneficiaries, albeit in differential ways. It is paradoxical to note that the CFUGs which are at the closest proximity from the forests (and forest-based-livelihoods) seem to be at the largest distance in terms of decision-making roles; on the other hand, the political-bureaucratic institutions of Nepal, which are comparatively at a father distance from their interaction to the forest on a day-to-day basis, are controlling the decisions. This paradox suggests that the decisions (or their lack thereof) made at the top bureaucratic institutions have major impacts in the livelihood functionalities of the local community; whereas, the decisions made by the local communities have little impact vice versa. Therefore, the productivity and efficiency of CF, to a considerable degree, is working under the assumption that all levels of the bureaucratic-hierarchy will naturally work to maximize the benefits for the CFUGs. In reality, however, this is not entirely accurate. Hence, an important indicator becomes, whether the complexity of the bureaucratic mechanism in Nepal, at least in part, could explain the receding trends in CF-practices compared to its robust and exemplary past.